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What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, how in­
finite in faculty! In form and moving how express and admir­
able! In action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a 
god! The beauty of the world. The paragon of animals.
— Hamlet (2.2.303–07)
Abstract: I defend the unpopular view that inference can create jus­
tification.  I  call  this view  inferential  creationism.  Inferential  cre­
ationism has been favored by infinitists, who think that it supports 
infinitism. But it doesn’t. Finitists can and should accept creation­
ism.
1. Introduction
Can reasoning create justification? Prevailing philosophical opinion 
says that it can’t, and that reasoning is a mere tool for transmitting 
justification from one belief to another. But prevailing opinion is 
wrong. Inference can create justification. Inferential creationism is 
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true. That is my thesis.
Creationism has recently served as a bellwether of infinitism’s 
prospects. Infinitists have aligned their view with creationism, and 
their opponents have aligned against it. But this is a mere diversion. 
The truth of creationism neither advantages nor disadvantages in­
finitism. Creationism can and should be a common ground of non­
skeptical epistemology.
Here is the plan. Sections 2–4 show that inferential creationism 
isn’t the province of infinitism; in the process, I distinguish several 
versions of inferential creationism. Section 5 rebuts objections to 
creationism. Section 6 advances three creationist arguments. Sec­
tion  7  introduces  some  examples  that  might  be  worth  thinking 
about in relation to creationism.
2. Reasoning is critical
Infinitists are admirably ecumenical, acknowledging that rivals, es­
pecially  foundationalism,  have  identified  genuine  and  important 
epistemic statuses (Klein 2005, 2011a; Aikin 2010).1 But infinitists 
also insist that foundationalism isn’t the whole story. Foundational­
ists say that there are proper stopping points in the chain of reasons 
a belief is based on, most notably perceptual experience, which we 
share with our cousins throughout the animal world. But for some 
important epistemic statuses, infinitists think, stopping points ex­
1 Klein  has  consistently  and  forthrightly  acknowledged  insights  from  not 
only  foundationalism,  but  also  coherentism  and  Pyrrhonian  skepticism. 
Aikin adopts elements of foundationalism.
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ude an air  arbitrariness or  indignity. We seem to aspire to  some­
thing nobler, and sometimes we take ourselves to rise higher. Infin­
itism taps into this aspiration and self­conception: noble in reason,  
infinite in faculty.
To get a sense of this, consider briefly a couple leading argu­
ments for infinitism. First, the interrogation argument for infinit­
ism concerns ‘the most highly prized form of true belief,’ or the kind 
of knowledge that human adults take themselves to be capable of 
(Klein 2011b). Such knowledge requires full justification.2 Distinct­
ively human knowledge is distinguished by the importance of reas­
oning in attaining full justification: we make our beliefs fully justi­
fied  by  reasoning  in  support  of  them.  Reasoning  is  partly con­
stitutive of full  justification, and so is essential to it.  A calculator 
might know that 2+2=4, and a greyhound might know that his mas­
ter is calling, but neither the calculator nor the greyhound reasons 
in support of their knowledge. Their knowledge is merely mechan­
ical or brute. Adult humans are capable of such unreasoned know­
ledge, but we are also capable of a more dignified sort of knowledge 
involving full justification, replete with the value added by reason­
ing.
The interrogation argument is motivated by a specific version of 
the regress problem, which emerges from an imagined interroga­
tion. Suppose you believe that Q. Then someone asks you a legitim­
ate question concerning the basis of your belief that Q. You respond 
2 For an antecedent that argues for infinitism on the ground that it can best 
explain  complete justification, see Fantl 2003, and Turri 2010a for a re­
sponse.
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by citing  reason R1.  You are  then  legitimately  asked about  your 
basis for believing R1. You cite reason R2. Then you are legitimately 
asked  about  your  basis  for  believing  R2.  A  pattern  is  emerging. 
How, if it all, can the reasoning resolve itself such that you’re fully 
justified in believing Q? Infinitists answer: by continuing indefin­
itely. In  principle  there  is  no  limit  to  the  interrogation  because 
every belief is susceptible to legitimate questioning. So potentially 
indefinitely long reasoning seems to be  exactly  what is needed for 
the reasoning to result in full justification.
Second, the proceduralist argument for infinitism begins from 
the premise that knowledge is a ‘reflective success’  (Aikin 2009). 
Reflective  success  requires  thinking  carefully  and  being  able  to 
make our careful thinking explicit. To make our careful thinking ex­
plicit is to state our reasons. And for a reason to legitimately figure 
into our careful thinking, we must have a reason for thinking that it 
is true in turn. So if you know something, then you can properly an­
swer all questions about your belief and your reasons. But in prin­
ciple there are an infinite number of questions about your belief 
and your reasons. And no proper answer will implicate you in ques­
tion­begging circularity. So in principle you need an infinite num­
ber of answers.
These  infinitist  arguments  emphasize  our  rational  agency  in 
creating full  justification or human knowledge or some other im­
portant positive epistemic status. These things don’t just happen to 
us; they don’t just fall into our laps. Reasoning is something we can 
and must do to help create these intellectual goods.
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Infinitists aren’t alone in focusing on such goods.  Interest  in 
valuable cognitive achievements involving reasoning, effort and cre­
ativity has a long history in epistemology, even though interest in 
simpler  cognitive  achievements  has  loomed  large  lately.  But  we 
don’t need to choose between the two. As Linda Zagzebski (forth­
coming) writes,
What  Plato  called  ‘episteme’  and  Aquinas  called  ‘scientia’ 
was a state that demanded considerable reflection and cog­
nitive  effort.  What  most  contemporary  philosophers  call 
‘knowledge’ does not. So contemporary epistemologists typ­
ically treat simple, true perceptual beliefs in ordinary condi­
tions  as  knowledge,  whereas  typical  ancient  and medieval 
philosophers did not. I suspect that there is no determinate 
answer  to  the  question  whether  Plato  and  Aquinas  differ 
from contemporary philosophers on the analysis of the same 
epistemic state, or whether ancient and medieval philosoph­
ers were simply talking about a different epistemic state than 
the one that has received the most attention in contemporary 
epistemology. But I also think that the answer to this ques­
tion is  not  very  important.  If  there  are a  number of  good 
kinds  of  distinguishable  states  of  believing the  truth,  it  is 
worth calling attention to them, whether or not they all fall 
under the class of states of knowing.
And of course Aristotle also recognized a special category of know­
ledge that required reasoning: scientific knowledge. Aristotle con­
sidered scientific knowledge to be “the highest expression of [hu­
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man] rationality” (Bolton and Code 2012: 52).
With this ecumenical spirit in mind, from now on I will often 
speak simply of ‘knowledge’, ‘justification’ or ‘warrant’, trusting that 
they’ll be understood in the way infinitists prefer.
3. Reasoning is compatible
Suppose we agree that  reasoning is required for  and partly  con­
stitutive  of  human knowledge,  full  justification or  warrant.  Does 
this support infinitism? I will  argue that it  doesn’t. Let’s start by 
getting clearer on the minimal commitments of the views in ques­
tion.
If you supposedly know that A, then the question ‘How do you 
know A is true?’ arises, and threatens to renew itself repeatedly, as 
we saw earlier when briefly considering the two arguments for in­
finitism. The challenge is to explain how, if at all, the pattern might 
unfold so as to vindicate the initial assumption that you actually do 
know  that  A  is  true.3 There  are  exactly  three  possible  patterns, 
which can be  sorted neatly  by  asking two questions.4 Does the 
pattern ever circle back (to repeat an earlier item)? If it does, 
then the pattern is circular; if it doesn’t, then it’s non­circular. Sup­
3 The same goes for the supposition that you have a warranted or (fully) jus­
tified belief that A is true. For convenience I will  typically speak only of 
knowledge or of justification or of warrant, but what I say typically applies 
to them all. Exploring residual differences lies beyond this paper’s scope.
4 This isn’t the unique acceptable way of dividing up all possible patterns, 
but it suffices for present purposes. For example, we might start with, ‘is  
the pattern finite?’, then ask, ‘does it ever circle back?’. We might end up 
with infinite series that contain loops along the way. Thanks to Andy Cling 
for discussion here.
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pose  we  have  a  non­circular  pattern.  Does  the  pattern  ever 
end? If it does end, then the pattern is finite and non­repeating; if 
it doesn’t end, then the pattern is infinite and non­repeating. Thus 
we have three possible patterns: circular, finite and infinite.
Skeptics deny that any of the three patterns can enable know­
ledge; non­skeptics accept that at least one can. Non­skeptics have 
up to three options:
Circulism: circular patterns can enable knowledge.5
Finitism: finite patterns can enable knowledge.6
Infinitism: infinite patterns can enable knowledge.
These minimal options are not mutually exclusive: the conjunction 
of circulism, finitism and infinitism is logically consistent. But the­
oretical purity is tempting, so nonskeptics might adopt additional 
theses — perhaps more deserving of the suffix ­ism — that render 
their views mutually exclusive.
Pure circulism: only circular patterns can enable knowledge.
Pure finitism: only finite patterns can enable knowledge.
Pure infinitism: only infinite patterns can enable knowledge.
Between  minimalism and  theoretical  purity  lie  further  permuta­
tions.  We might be amenable to more than one form of pattern, 
provided that our favored one is also present. Thus we get:
5 I  avoid the label  ‘coherentism’ because it is  plagued by imprecision and 
baggage. 
6 I avoid the label ‘foundationalism’ because it too is plagued by imprecision 
and baggage. See Sosa 1980 and 1983 for a brilliant discussion of the com­
patibility of coherentism and (some forms of) foundationalism, as well as 
(some forms of) foundationalism and infinite regression.
John Turri |  8
Strong circulism: knowledge is enabled only when at least 
one circular pattern is present.
Strong finitism: knowledge is enabled only when at least one 
finite pattern is present.
Strong infinitism: knowledge is enabled only when at least 
one infinite pattern is present.
All  three  minimal  options  are  compatible  with  the  view that 
reasoning is required for and partly constitutive of knowledge. And 
all the pure and strong options are compatible with it too. Consider:
Pure  reasoned  circulism:  only  circular  patterns  involving 
reasoning can enable knowledge.
Pure reasoned finitism: only finite patterns involving reas­
oning can enable knowledge.
Pure  reasoned  infinitism:  only  infinite  patterns  involving 
reasoning can enable knowledge.
Strong reasoned circulism: knowledge is enabled only if at 
least one reasoned circular pattern is present.
Strong reasoned finitism:  knowledge is  enabled  only  if  at 
least one reasoned finite pattern is present.
Strong reasoned infinitism: knowledge is enabled only if at 
least one reasoned infinite pattern is present.
All six views are self­consistent. So when we’re told, ‘Infinitists see 
an important  type of  justification as  emerging when reasons are 
given for our beliefs’ (Klein 2011a: 94), we should be careful not to 
conclude that circularists or finitists must overlook the importance 
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of such justification.7
4. Reasoning is creative
All three structural views can embrace the importance of reasoning, 
so infinitism gains no advantage there.8 But finitists have not em­
phasized it, whereas infinitists have. Moreover, finitists have tended 
to deny something further that infinitists have endorsed: that reas­
oning is  creative, that it can  originate warrant. This is inferential 
creationism. (In what follows, I use ‘reasoning’ and ‘inference’ in­
terchangeably. And I won’t explicitly distinguish between creation­
ism about justification, warrant or knowledge.) So if inferential cre­
ationism  is  true,  then  infinitism  might  gain  an  advantage  here. 
Grant that inferential creationism is true. Does this spell trouble for 
finitism?9
Creationism comes in weak, strong and pure forms.10 The weak 
form says that inference can amplify already existing justification 
during transmission. The strong form says that inference can create 
justification where none existed before. The pure form says that in­
ference is the only origin of justification. More precisely:
Weak inferential creationism: inference can amplify justific­
7 Klein notes soon after, ‘hybrid views are possible’ (2011a: 95).
8 Turri 2009 presses a very similar point in response to Klein 2005.
9 Cling 2004 argues that in order for infinitist justification to be appropri­
ately connected to truth, infinitism must be supplemented in a way that 
undermines its motivation. But if infinitism is uniquely positioned to ex­
plain the importance of reasoning for justification, then it would still  be 
motivated.
10 In section 6.2 I identify a further form.
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ation: reasoning only from a premise justified to degree 
n can result  in a conclusion justified to degree  n+m, 
where n>0 and m>0.
Strong inferential creationism: reasoning can create justific­
ation ex nihilo: reasoning only from a premise justified 
to degree 0 can result in a conclusion justified to a de­
gree greater than 0.
Pure inferential creationism: reasoning and only reasoning 
can create justification.
Every view about knowledge or justification faces a question: 
where does it originate? How is it produced? Finitists have typically 
answered this question by appealing to nondoxastic mental states 
that we often seem to base our beliefs on, including perceptual ex­
periences, introspective experiences, and rational intuitions. These 
nondoxastic states provide proper stopping points in the regress of 
reasons: they are an epistemological foundation. This way of sup­
plementing finitism goes all the way back to Aristotle, who identi­
fied experience and intuition as an ‘originative source’ of ‘the skill of 
the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science’ (Posterior 
Analytics, 100a5, 72b18–24).
Finitism is often paired with a distinctive view about the epi­
stemological  role  of  inference, pure  inferential  instrumentalism: 
inference can transmit justification but cannot create it.11 Inference 
is an instrument of transmission, not creation. This view seems to 
11 Klein 2011b calls this ‘The Inheritance Principle.’ See also Plantinga 1993: 76.
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conflict with inferential creationism (more on this in section 6.2). 
Setting the tone as usual for finitism, Aristotle seems to reject all 
forms of inferential creationism.12 He rejects pure creationism when 
he writes, ‘Our own doctrine is that not all  knowledge is demon­
strative; on the contrary, knowledge of the immediate premises is 
independent  of  demonstration’  (Posterior  Analytics 72b19–20). 
And he arguably also rejects strong and weak creationism when he 
writes, ‘We must know the prior premises from which the demon­
stration is drawn’ (72b22), and, ‘Demonstration must be based on 
premises prior to and better known than the conclusion’ (72b25–6). 
More recently, Carl Ginet puts the point directly: ‘Inference cannot 
originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to con­
clusion’ (2005: 148). 
But finitists aren’t committed to any of this. Finitism does not 
12 I stress ‘seems’ in reporting this interpretation of Aristotle (following Klein 
2011b). But I actually don’t think this was Aristotle’s view. I think that Aris­
totle was, pretty much explicitly, a strong creationist about scientific know­
ledge  (perhaps  better  referred  to  as  understanding). Without  getting 
bogged down in Aristotle exegesis, I’ll briefly explain my rationale for this 
attribution. On Aristotle’s view, proper inference from common perceptual 
knowledge ultimately leads to a new kind of achievement, scientific know­
ledge. Scientific knowledge is based on premises that aren’t scientifically 
known. Consider how two leading contemporary scholars explain Aristotle 
on this point. ‘Experience as such does not involve explanatory or causal 
knowledge. . . . [Although] the attainment of causal knowledge about the 
physical  world  depends  upon  general  perceptual  knowledge,  scientific 
knowledge  involves  reasoning to  and  from  explanatory  principles  and 
hence  goes  well  beyond  what  the  perceptual  faculty  itself  can  provide’ 
(Bolton and Code 2012: 51–2). And, ‘Although the use of our perceptual ca­
pacities provides a complex and rich array of perceptual and experiential 
knowledge of that world, this higher cognitive achievement [i.e. ‘systematic 
understanding’ or ‘scientific knowledge’] requires the use and exercise of 
distinctly  intellectual capacities, over and above what can be provided by 
the perceptual faculty alone’ (52–3).
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entail pure inferential instrumentalism. Pure instrumentalism is an 
additional and optional thesis. Indeed, finitism is consistent with 
all three forms of inferential creationism, just as circulism and in­
finitism are. Granting that reasoning originates warrant confers no 
advantage on infinitism.  Clear­headed finitists who reject inferen­
tial creationism will do so because they think it’s implausible or that 
there are independent arguments against it, not because it’s incon­
sistent with finitism.
5. Uncreative bias
Inferential creationism is a very unpopular view, especially among 
contemporary finitists.  Is  its unpopularity deserved?  This section 
evaluates the case against it. First I argue that the typical nonskep­
tical finitist cannot plausibly reject inferential creationism, because 
it is no less plausible than the finitist’s own preferred strategy for 
explaining how warrant originates. Then I rebut two other objec­
tions to inferential creationism.
5.1. Creation, inferential and otherwise
The basing relation is the relation that obtains between a belief and 
the reason it’s based on13. One of the relata, the terminus, is always 
a belief. Call this the terminal belief. The other relata, the prompt, 
is  a  belief  only  sometimes:  there  are  doxastic  and  nondoxastic 
prompts. A doxastic prompt is ordinarily called a  premise, and its 
13 Turri 2011 defends a theory of the basing relation.
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terminus  a  conclusion.  We  call  the  basing  relation  an  inference 
when its prompt is doxastic:  inferences proceed from premise to 
conclusion. Inference is just basing with a doxastic prompt. Non­
doxastic prompts include perceptual experiences and rational intu­
itions. We don’t have an ordinary name specifically for the class of 
nondoxastic prompts. (We do call them reasons, grounds or bases, 
but the same is true of doxastic prompts.) Although it’s less natural 
to label the terminus of a nondoxastic prompt a  conclusion, it can 
be acceptable to do so.14 (None of the points I make here depend on 
supposing that the terminus of a nondoxastic prompt is a conclu­
sion, properly so­called.)
Finitists have in fact always accepted that the basing relation 
can create justification. That is, they accept basing creationism. In 
fact, they accept a strong version of it:
Strong basing creationism: basing can create justification ex 
nihilo: a nondoxastic prompt with justification of de­
gree  0 can result in a conclusion justified to a degree 
greater than 0.15
To see why finitists accept this, first let’s make a standard dis­
tinction between propositional and doxastic justification.16 Roughly, 
14 Nondoxastic prompts also include desires, wishes and emotions. Ordinarily 
we call the basing relation wishful thinking when prompted by a desire or 
wish, and emotional reasoning when prompted by a desire. Cognitive sci­
entists include all of the above in the category of motivated inference.
15 Some finitists might also accept pure basing creationism: basing and only 
basing can create justification.  I  struggle  to  see  any motivation for this 
view.
16 These are serviceable first approximations. See Turri 2010b for further re­
finement and discussion.
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you are propositionally justified in believing Q just in case you have 
good reason to believe it. And your belief that Q is doxastically justi­
fied just in case (i) you are propositionally justified in believing Q, 
and (ii) you properly base your belief on the good reason you have 
to  believe  it.  Friendlier  terminology  than  ‘propositional’  and 
‘doxastic  justification’  would  be  ‘justifiable’  and  ‘well­founded’.17 
(This  is  an  indication  that  the  distinction  has  a  pre­theoretical 
basis.) I have defined these categories in terms of belief, but that’s 
just for convenience. Attitudes of acceptance other than belief can 
also be justifiable and well­founded.18 But as the name indicates, 
doxastic justification attaches to doxastic states, not other things.
We could distinguish at  least  two versions  of  every principle 
mentioned so far concerned with justification. I won’t explicitly do 
that.  Let’s  just  instead  have  doxastic  justification  in  mind  when 
reading them.19 The current controversy over creationism focuses 
on doxastic justification. It began when philosophers started asking 
whether infinitism could offer a plausible account of doxastic justi­
fication (see Klein  2007,  Bergmann 2007,  Turri  2009b;  see also 
Bergmann 2013 and Kvanvig 2013).
Next let’s consider some typical examples of doxastically justi­
fied belief offered by finitists.
17 Feldman and Conee 1985.
18 Other  eligible  states  are  disbelief,  withholding,  assuming,  presupposing, 
taking it for granted, and perhaps also trust and faith.
19 We could speak more generally of available versus well­grounded positive 
epistemic status, where propositional justification is a species of available 
positive  epistemic  status,  and doxastic  justification  is  a  species  of  well­
grounded positive epistemic status.
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Jack feels a severe pain and says “ouch, that hurts!” Let’s say 
that Jack at that time believes that he is in pain and that this 
belief is based on his awareness of his experience of pain and 
is not inferred from any other beliefs he has. Foundational­
ists will think that this belief of Jack’s is noninferentially jus­
tified and is a perfect  example [of a properly basic belief]. 
(Bergmann 2013: xx)
At least in the typical case, when you have a clear view of a 
bright red object, then your experience itself justifies the be­
lief  that  you  are  seeing  something  red.  That  belief  is  the 
proper response to that experience. (Feldman 2003: 77)
Consider the proposition that nothing can be red all over and 
green all over at the same time. Suppose that this proposi­
tion is presented for my consideration. After extremely brief 
consideration,  I  accept  the  proposition.  [Clearly]  I  have  a 
good, indeed an excellent reason for thinking that the claim 
in question is true. But what is the basis for this justification? 
[It] apparently depends on nothing beyond an understand­
ing of the propositional content itself, a proposition whose 
necessity is apprehended in this way. It is common to refer to 
the intellectual act in which the necessity of such a proposi­
tion is  seen as an act  of  rational  intuition.  (adapted from 
BonJour 1998: 101–2)20
20 Everything here is direct quotation, but it is heavily abridged. BonJour ex­
pands what could be a very simple and concise explanation over the course 
of multiple pages. I left out more than half a dozen ellipses.
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Consider the following sentence: (A) Anything that lasts ex­
actly one hour lasts exactly sixty minutes. . . . Someone who 
does  understand what  sentence  A  says,  and  therefore  be­
lieves it, is justified in believing it. The fact which constitutes 
his being justified in believing it is simply the fact that he un­
derstands what the sentence says. (Ginet 2005: 141)
And  consider  a  more  general  theoretical  account  of  justification 
offered by a leading finitist.
One has noninferential justification for believing P when one 
has the thought that P and when one is acquainted with the 
correspondence between the thought that P and the fact that 
P.  The idea is that when one has immediately before con­
sciousness both the truth bearer and the truth maker one has 
all one needs, all one could ever want, by way of justification. 
(Fumerton 2006: 65).
So finitists clearly think that beliefs can be doxastically justified 
when based on introspective and perceptual experience, rational in­
tuition,  linguistic  comprehension,  and  more  generally  direct  ac­
quaintance with facts. But these are all nondoxastic states: none is a 
belief or belief­like state of acceptance. (Some are even nonmental 
states.) So they can’t be doxastically justified. Yet basing a belief on 
them creates doxastic justification. This is strong basing creation­
ism.
Finitists object to inferential creationism on the grounds that 
‘there is nothing in the inferential relation itself that contributes to 
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making . . . beliefs justified, nothing that explains why any of them 
is justified’ (Ginet 2005: 149). But the basing relation itself is the 
same whether the prompt is doxastic or nondoxastic, so if there’s 
nothing in that relation when prompted by belief, then there’s noth­
ing in that relation when prompted otherwise. Finitists also object 
to inferential creationism on the grounds that ‘one can’t get some­
thing from nothing’ (Fumerton 2006: 39). But they accept that the 
basing relation sometimes gives us something for nothing, so this is 
just special pleading.
As Thomas Reid pointed out, it is one thing to be a thorough 
and consistent skeptic, but quite another to be a mere semi­skeptic. 
Semi­skeptics  about  creationism  must  answer  a  question:  if  the 
basing relation can create doxastic justification when the prompt is 
nondoxastic, then why can’t it when the prompt is doxastic? That is, 
if strong basing creationism is true, then why isn’t strong inferential 
creationism true too?
5.2. If that were true . . . 
In this subsection I consider two objections to inferential creation­
ism. Neither succeeds. I emphasize that both objections were made 
in the context of evaluating a view combining elements of infinitism 
and creationism. Neither objection was offered in light of the dis­
tinctions made here; both objections might be more effective when 
directed at an admixture of creationism and infinitism; and their 
authors might not endorse them as they are presented here.21 Con­
21 Both arguments are made against Klein’s views. I think the objections are 
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sidering them might prove instructive nonetheless.
The first objection is that if inferential creationism were true, 
then
one could start with a belief that is totally unjustified . . . and 
by  spinning  out  a  long  enough chain of  inference  from it 
reach a belief that has the degree of justification required for 
knowledge. (Ginet 2005: 155)
The objection misfires if directed at either weak or strong inferen­
tial creationism. Neither view entails that inference alone can create 
knowledge­level  justification.  It  might  work  against  nonskeptical 
versions of pure infinitism, though, which is probably how it was in­
tended.
Here is the second objection:
Suppose you have two beliefs, B1 and B2, both of which are 
not justified at all, because neither of them is based on any 
reasons or evidence at all. And suppose also that B2 implies 
B1. Can B1 become justified to some degree solely in virtue of 
your  later  inferring  it  from  the  still  unjustified  belief  B2, 
which implies it? It seems clear that the answer is ‘no’. Infer­
ence  from  reasons  doesn’t  yield  any  justification  if  those 
reasons have nothing going for them, epistemically speaking. 
(Bergmann 2013: xx)
This objection faces two problems. First, it is slightly misdirected. 
partly motivated by unclarity about exactly how much of a role Klein as­
signs to reasoning in creating various positive epistemic statuses.
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Strong  inferential  creationism  says  that  inference  can  generate 
doxastic justification even when the prompt has no doxastic justific­
ation. Weak creationism says that inference can amplify doxastic 
justification.  Neither  view  entails  that  inference  can  generate 
doxastic justification even when the prompt has no redeeming epi­
stemic property at all.  So let’s adjust the end of the objection to 
read, ‘. . . if those reasons have no doxastic justification themselves.’
This brings me to the second problem. By parity of reasoning 
we could equally well refute basing creationism in general:
Suppose you’re  in two mental  states,  M1 and M2,  both of 
which  are  not  justified  at  all,  because  neither  of  them  is 
based on any reasons or evidence at all. And suppose that 
M2 supports M1. Can M1 become better justified to some de­
gree solely in virtue of your later basing it from the still un­
justified M2, which supports it? It seems clear that the an­
swer is ‘no’. Basing from reasons doesn’t yield any justifica­
tion  if  those  reasons  have  no  doxastic  justification  them­
selves.
But strong basing creationism is a staple of finitism, endorsed by 
Aristotle, Bergmann, Ginet, Fumerton and many others who reject 
inferential creationism. This reiterates a lesson already learned: it’s 
not easy to find a principled way to reject inferential creationism 
while accepting nondoxastic basing creationism.
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6. Creative evidence
Suppose I’m right that inferential creationism’s unpopularity isn’t 
due to compelling objections. It doesn’t follow that inferential cre­
ationism is true, or that we should accept it. Perhaps it’s neverthe­
less so implausible on its face that it deserves to die a quick death 
by incredulous stare. Is there any positive reason to accept inferen­
tial creationism? Yes. This section presents three arguments in its 
favor.
6.1. Parity
Here  is  my first  argument.  It  recycles  some material  introduced 
earlier.
Parity
1. If basing creationism is true, then inferential creationism is 
true. (Premise)
2. Basing creationism is true. (Premise)
3. So inferential creationism is true. (From 1 and 2)
Nearly every nonskeptical finitist who has ever written accepts line 
2. The evidence for line 1 has already been mentioned:  the basing 
relation itself is the same whether the prompt is doxastic or non­
doxastic, so if there’s nothing in the relation that can create justific­
ation when the prompt is doxastic, then there’s nothing in it when 
the prompt is nondoxastic either.
I imagine the following objection to line 1. The basing relation 
always has the same potential to create doxastic justification: if it 
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relates your belief B to a good reason for you to hold B, then B is 
thereby doxastically justified.  Beliefs  can be good reasons only if 
they are doxastically justified. But nondoxastic states can be good 
reasons even if they aren’t doxastically justified. For they can’t be 
justified or unjustified: they are beyond the pale of justification.
I have two responses to this objection. First, even if granted in 
its entirety, it rules out only strong and pure inferential creation­
ism. It doesn’t affect weak creationism.22
Second, granting that nondoxastic states are beyond the pale of 
justification, we’re left to wonder how they could play the role of 
good reasons. (This is related to, but not quite the same, as the in­
tuition underlying one horn of ‘the Sellarsian dilemma’ for founda­
tionalism. See Sellars 1963: ch. 5 and BonJour 2003.) A very popu­
lar answer is that they can be good reasons because they are reliable 
indicators of  the truth (Sellars  1963: ch.  5,  Sosa 2003, Goldman 
2008). But beliefs can be reliable indications too, so this fails to dis­
tinguish nondoxastic states from beliefs. To be persuasive, the ob­
jection  should  be  supplemented  by  an  explanation  of  why  non­
doxastic states can be good reasons which doesn’t also apply to be­
liefs.
A more radical solution would be to reject line 2. There are at 
least three ways to do that without courting skepticism. (Of course 
there may be others too.) The first way is to embrace Berkeleyan 
idealism. Worldly facts  are actually doxastic states:  beliefs in the 
mind of God. (Alternatively: beliefs of the community; or the world 
22 It doesn’t affect minimal creationism either; see section 6.2.
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is just brutely constituted by such mental states.)23 All such beliefs 
amount to propositional knowledge. Our most basic beliefs would 
thus be based on something that is already optimally doxastically 
justified. Pure basing instrumentalism is then all that’s needed, and 
the pressure to accept inferential creationism is thereby alleviated. 
The second way is to revive a largely moribund brand of founda­
tionalism, doxastic creationism: the very act of forming beliefs with 
a certain content imbues them with some amount of justification 
(Chisholm 1980, Davidson 1983, Harman 1995). If this is true, then 
basing creationism isn’t needed to explain basic justification, and 
again, the pressure to accept inferential creationism is alleviated. 
The third strategy is to leave the basing relation to one side, and in­
stead contend that  beliefs  acquire  justification  superveniently  by 
other means.24 On this view, strictly speaking it is never because of 
the basing relation that beliefs are justified. Rather, it is because be­
liefs are, say, the result of a reliable cognitive process, or of a virtue, 
or of a design plan aimed at truth, or because they would be ap­
proved by a suitable observer, or some other relation.
I doubt that the first strategy for rejecting line 2 will be attract­
ive  to  many.  But  the  second  strategy  might  be.  Many  have  ex­
pressed sympathy for views that would lend doxastic creationism 
support.25 However, we should remember that doxastic creationism 
23 McDowell’s (1994) view that the conceptual as ‘unbounded’, or that we can 
‘embrace’ facts in thought, isn’t enough to sustain the present suggestion. 
For the present suggestion to work, the world needs to be not merely con­
ceptual but literally doxastic.
24 As suggested to me by Andy Cling.
25 ‘Belief is in its nature veridical,’ said Davidson (1983: 146), and long before 
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is  consistent  with  both  basing  and  inferential  creationism.  And 
since  belief­formation is a constitutive component of both basing 
generally and inference specifically, doxastic creationism might en­
tail both basing and inferential creationism. So this strategy for un­
dermining line 2 of the argument might be doomed from the start. 
The third strategy strikes me as peculiar and difficult to evaluate. I 
grant that it’s a possible view. But so is the view that the basing re­
lation is part of the relevant subvenient basis. I don’t understand 
the motivation for simply relegating the basing relation in this way. 
Moreover, what assurance is there that beliefs couldn’t equally well 
gain justification superveniently through noninferential relations to 
unjustified beliefs? Perhaps having certain unjustified beliefs en­
hances our overall reliability, or enhances virtue, or is part of the 
relevant design plan, or would be approved of by the suitable ob­
server. If so, then what has been achieved, other than a clever leap 
from the proverbial frying pan?
6.2. Creative instrument
Pure inferential instrumentalism is a chimera. It says that inference 
can transmit justification but can’t create it. That can easily sound 
like a view worth considering. But the only reason it doesn’t imme­
diately sound utterly ridiculous is that we don’t interpret it literally. 
Because,  literally,  inference  obviously  does  not  transfer  justifica­
that, Santayana wrote, ‘Intelligence is by nature veridical’ (1923: 9). If the 
mind does essentially tend toward true beliefs, that does lend support to 
doxastic creationism (but see Foley 1983).
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tion, whereas it clearly does create justification.
Suppose that my belief that P is justified. And suppose that I am 
fully justified in believing that P entails Q. And suppose that I com­
petently deduce Q from P.  Of course my concluding belief in Q is 
thereby justified — and presumably to the same degree, or almost 
the same degree, as my belief in P. But this is not because the justi­
fication attaching to my belief that P gets transmitted to my belief 
that  Q,  thereby leaving my belief  in  P  unjustified!26 Justification 
isn’t a quantity transmitted and conserved by the inferential rela­
tion. The justification for my belief that Q didn’t used to be attached 
to my belief that P. Nor does the justification for my belief that P di­
minish — in perfect inverse proportion — as my belief that Q be­
comes justified. Rather my belief that P remains just as justified as 
it was before, for the same reasons as before, and my belief that Q 
becomes justified to a similar degree. So the total amount of justi­
fication in the system has been increased:  more justification has 
been created, courtesy of the inferential relation. Any view that en­
tails otherwise is thereby refuted.27
So the literal interpretation of pure inferential instrumentalism 
straightforwardly entails something quite ridiculous, namely,  that 
the total amount of justification in a system of beliefs cannot in­
crease due to inference. I trust that no one (skeptics aside) inter­
26 I hesitate to mention it,  but there is another option: my belief  that P is 
automagically  re­justified  by  justification  from  somewhere  else.  I  can’t 
bring myself to even take this seriously.
27 Notice that it doesn’t matter whether the justification for Q is discounted 
due to aggregated risk over inference. It matters only that Q is to at least  
some extent justified in virtue of the inference.
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prets it that way, which is why they don’t immediately reject it as 
absurd. 
Inferential instrumentalism seems plausible because it is impli­
citly  interpreted  charitably  as  a  form  of  inferential  creationism, 
what we can call,
Minimal inferential creationism: inference can increase the 
total amount of justification in a system of beliefs.
More fully spelled out, minimal inferential creationism says that the 
following can happen: (i) begin with a set of beliefs, B1 . . . Bn, such 
that (a) their respective levels of justification J1 + . . . + Jn = Jm, 
and (b) none is inferentially based on any of the others; (ii) then in­
ferentially base one member of the set on one or more of the other 
members; (iii) in virtue of that inferential basing, the sum of B1 . . . 
Bn’s  respective levels  of  justification  increases — that is,  now J1 
+ . . . + Jn > Jm.
Here is my second argument encapsulated: 
Creative Instrument
1. If the most  plausible version of inferential instrumentalism 
is true, then inferential creationism is true. (Premise)
2. The most plausible version of inferential instrumentalism is 
true. (Premise)
3. So inferential creationism is true. (From 1 and 2)
6.3. Improvement
My third argument is based on a story.
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Once upon a time, you believed Q based on what is an ir­
redeemably bad reason B.  You are doxastically  justified in 
believing B,  but  B doesn’t  support  Q at  all.  You were just 
badly mistaken to make the inference from B to Q. Your be­
lief that Q is not doxastically justified: it is not at all well­
founded or  properly  held.  But  you also  believe  something 
else, G1, which is a good reason to accept Q. So your belief 
that Q is propositionally justified. And you also believe one 
other thing, G2, which is a good reason to accept G1; so your 
belief in G1 is propositionally justified too. And you also one 
other thing, G3, which is a good reason to accept G2; so your 
belief in G2 is also propositionally justified. And this pattern 
continues indefinitely, such that: (i) for any arbitrarily high 
n, you believe Gn; (ii) Gn is a good reason to believe Gn­1; 
(iii) Gn+1 is a good reason to believe Gn; but (iv) you haven’t 
yet utilized the chain. You never noticed the connections and 
so haven’t accepted any Gn based on Gn+1. But you are thor­
oughly disposed to do so, should the question ever arise.
Then someone asks you why you think Q is true. You re­
flect for a moment and it strikes you that your reason for ac­
cepting Q is bad. Rather than hastily give up the belief, you 
ask yourself, ‘Do I have a good reason to accept Q?’ And then 
it occurs to you, ‘G1 is true, and if it’s true, then so is Q. So Q 
is true.’ Your belief in Q is now inferentially based on G1 in­
stead of B. And you lived happily ever after. The end.
Here is  a crucial  question: is  your belief in Q more properly 
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held or better founded at the end of this story than it was at the be­
ginning? Did you improve the way your belief is held? It seems ob­
vious to me that you did. Your belief that Q is now more properly 
held, better founded than it was before, in virtue of being based on  
what is in fact a good reason for holding it, namely G1. And this re­
mains true even though G1 is not yet based on a good reason for  
holding it — that is, G1 is not yet based on G2. Your belief in G1 is 
more poorly founded than your belief in Q, which is based on it. So 
the story shows that at least weak inferential creationism is true.
The story also arguably shows that strong inferential creation­
ism is true. Suppose that having some measure of doxastic justifica­
tion requires being based on a good reason.28 G1 isn’t based on G2 
by the end of the story. So G1 lacks any measure of doxastic justific­
ation at the end of the story. But your belief in Q gained some meas­
ure of doxastic justification in virtue of being based on G1. So if the 
supposition is true, then strong inferential creationism is true.
Let me encapsulate the argument based on the story:
Improvement
1. If your belief is better founded at the end of the story, then 
inferential creationism is true.
2. Your belief is better founded at the end of the story.
3. So inferential creationism is true.
28 I actually doubt that this is true (see Turri 2010b). But most epistemolo­
gists accept it, so I present it for consideration. In any event, we might be 
able to reach the same conclusion by stipulating that in the story your be­
lief in G1 doesn’t have any other property sufficient to doxastically justify it 
to some extent. But that’s a rather bold stipulation.
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7. Odds and ends
In this  final section I introduce some examples where normative 
properties are created. None of these immediately leads to further 
arguments  in  favor  of  creationism.  But  they’re  worth  having  in 
view, since they might help us better understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of creationism, and perhaps also infinitism, by compar­
ison.
Promising and moral duty.  Most  promises aren’t  obligatory. 
That is, typically when you make a promise, in no sense were you 
morally obliged to promise. But typically when you make a promise, 
you’re now obliged to do what you promised. Something that isn’t 
obligatory at all (a promise) can create obligations (to do what is 
promised). Strong promissory creationism about moral duty is true.
Procreation and moral duty. Procreation isn’t obligatory. Typ­
ically when people procreate, in no sense are they morally obliged 
to procreate. But typically when you procreate, you do incur moral 
obligations to care for your progeny. Something that isn’t obligatory 
at all (procreation) can create obligations (to care for your progeny).  
Strong procreation creationism (procreationism!) about moral duty 
is true.
Promising and moral justification. Some promises shouldn’t be 
made. But typically once they are made, even unjustified promises 
generate an obligation to do what is  promised.  When you follow 
through on an unjustified promise, your action is, at least to some 
extent,  morally justified by the fact  that it’s based on a promise. 
(Note:  it  might  still  be  all­things­considered  wrong  to  fulfill  the 
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promise.) Something that isn’t morally justified (the promise) can 
create  moral  justification  (for  doing  what  is  promised).  Strong 
promissory creationism about moral justification is true.
Context and aesthetic value. Suppose you’re a playwright. In­
spiration strikes! You have a fantastic idea for a final  scene.  You 
write it down. But it lacks prior context. Prior context would make it  
a better scene. Inspiration strikes again! You have a fantastic idea 
for a penultimate scene. You write it down. The final scene now has 
some prior context, which improves it. But the penultimate scene 
doesn’t have any prior context, at least not yet. Prior context would 
make it better. Something that lacks prior context and the aesthetic 
value that it brings (the penultimate scene) can give something else 
prior  context  and  the  aesthetic  value  it  brings  (the  final  scene). 
Working backwards, each previous scene you add to the play could 
in  turn  better  contextualize  and thereby  improve  all  of  the  sub­
sequent scenes,  despite itself  lacking lacking prior context or the 
value it brings. Strong creationism about aesthetic value is true.
Promising to infinity. Suppose that you have no reason at all to 
perform a certain action, say, to buy the mayor a gift as a token of 
appreciation for her public service. Then you promise someone, S1, 
that you will buy the gift. Now you have some reason to buy the gift. 
Then you promise S2 that you will fulfill your promise to S1. Now 
you have some more reason to buy the gift. Then you promise S3 
that  you will  fulfill  your  promise  to  S2.  Now you have yet  more 
reason to buy the gift. The longer this goes on, the more reason you 
have to buy the gift. And the longer it goes on, the better justified 
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your buying the gift  will  be. Of course, all  things considered you 
might  still  have more reason to  not buy the  gift,  no matter how 
many promises hang in the balance. Promising doesn’t settle mat­
ters once and for all. This is structurally similar to the way infinit­
ists have thought about doxastic justification.
8. Conclusion
Conventional wisdom is that inference can’t create justification. But 
as has happened so often before, conventional wisdom is wrong. I 
accomplished two main things in this paper. On the one hand, I 
mounted a vigorous defense of inferential creationism by respond­
ing to existing objections and presenting three positive arguments 
on its behalf. On the other, I explained why the truth of inferential 
creationism doesn’t advantage infinitism. Still, infinitists can take 
comfort in the fact that one popular objection to their view has been 
effectively neutralized.
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